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  The	   International	   Space	   Station	   (ISS)	   is	  the	   product	   of	   the	   efforts	   of	   sixteen	   na-­‐tions	   over	   the	   course	   of	   several	   decades.	  	  It	   is	   now	   complete,	   operational,	   and	   has	  been	   continuously	   occupied	   since	   No-­‐vember	  of	   20001.	   	   Since	   then	   the	   ISS	  has	  been	   carrying	   out	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   re-­‐search	   and	   technology	   development	   ex-­‐periments,	   and	   starting	   to	   produce	   some	  pleasantly	  startling	  results.	  	  The	  ISS	  has	  a	  mass	  of	  420	  metric	  tons,	  supports	  a	  crew	  of	  six	  with	  a	  yearly	  resupply	  requirement	  of	   around	   30	  metric	   tons,	   within	   a	   pres-­‐surized	  volume	  of	  916	  cubic	  meters,	  and	  a	  habitable	  volume	  of	  388	  cubic	  meters.	  	  Its	  solar	  arrays	  produce	  up	  to	  84	  kilowatts	  of	  power.	   	   In	   the	   course	   of	   developing	   the	  ISS,	  many	  lessons	  were	  learned	  and	  much	  valuable	  expertise	  was	  gained.	  	  Where	  do	  we	  go	  from	  here?	  	  The	   ISS	   offers	   an	   existence	   proof	   of	   the	  feasibility	  of	  sustained	  human	  occupation	  and	   operations	   in	   space	   over	   decades.	   It	  also	   demonstrates	   the	   ability	   of	   many	  countries	   to	   work	   collaboratively	   on	   a	  very	   complex	   and	   expensive	   project	   in	  space	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	   time	  to	  achieve	   a	   common	   goal.	   	   By	   harvesting	  best	  practices	  and	  lessons	  learned,	  the	  ISS	  can	   also	   serve	   as	   a	   useful	   model	   for	   ex-­‐ploring	   architectures	   for	   beyond	   low-­‐earth-­‐orbit	  (LEO)	  space	  development.	  	  	  	  This	   paper	   will	   explore	   the	   concept	   and	  feasibility	  for	  a	  Lunar	  Station.	  	  The	  Station	  concept	   can	   be	   implemented	   by	   either	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/#.VA58bI1dVS8	  
putting	   the	   equivalent	   capability	   of	   the	  ISS	   down	   on	   the	   surface	   of	   the	  Moon,	   or	  by	   developing	   the	   required	   capabilities	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  delivered	  mate-­‐rials	   and	   equipment	   and	   in	   situ	   resource	  utilization	  (ISRU).	  	  Scenarios	  that	  leverage	  existing	   technologies	   and	   capabilities	   as	  well	   as	   capabilities	   that	   are	   under	  devel-­‐opment	   and	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   available	  within	   the	   next	   3-­‐5	   years,	   will	   be	   exam-­‐ined.	   	   This	   paper	   will	   explore	   how	   best	  practices	   and	   expertise	   gained	   from	   de-­‐veloping	  and	  operating	   the	   ISS	  and	  other	  relevant	  programs	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  effec-­‐tively	  developing	  Lunar	  Station.	  	  	  	  
Why	   Lunar	   Station?	   –	   A	   Lunar	   Station	  can	   provide	   many	   benefits	   to	   NASA	   and	  the	  country.	  	  It	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  necessary	  step	   between	   our	   current	   capabilities	   in	  LEO,	  and	  our	  aspirations	  to	  one-­‐day	  trav-­‐el	  in	  person	  to	  Mars.	  	  It	  can	  provide	  a	  test-­‐ing	   and	   proving	   ground	   for	   a	   variety	   of	  important	  advanced	   technologies	  and	  ca-­‐pabilities,	   including	   robotics,	   ISRU,	   re-­‐source	   depots,	   deep	   space	   crew	  habitats,	  closed	   loop	   life	   support,	   in-­‐space	  propul-­‐sion,	   optical	   communication	   and	   space	  additive	  manufacturing	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  Its	  unique	   lunar	   environment,	   including	  large	   permanently	   shaded	   craters	   with	  temperatures	  as	  low	  as	  40	  °K 	  (-­‐388	  °F)2,	  offers	  opportunities	  for	  new	  scientific	  ob-­‐servations,	  exploration,	  investigation,	  and	  learning.	   	   Lunar	   Station	   will	   give	   our	  space	   program	   a	   much-­‐needed	   logical	  next	   step	   to	   strengthen	   our	   relevance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.space.com/7311-­‐moon-­‐craters-­‐coldest-­‐place-­‐solar-­‐system.html	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with	  the	  public,	  maintain	  our	  internation-­‐al	   space	   leadership,	   and	   hone	   our	   tech-­‐nical	  cutting	  edge.	  
	  
Lunar	  Exploration	  –	  A	  Brief	  History	  
	  President	   Kennedy	   launched	   the	   Apollo	  Program	  in	  May	  1961.	  	  This	  program	  sent	  12	  Americans	   to	   the	   surface	  of	   the	  Moon	  between	   July	   1969	   and	  December	  19723.	  The	   Apollo-­‐17	   astronauts	   were	   the	   last	  humans	   to	   visit	   the	   Moon.	   	   A	   recent	   as-­‐sessment	  put	  the	  program	  cost	  for	  Apollo	  at	   $174	   billion	   in	   today’s	   dollars 4 .	  	  Planned	  missions	  beyond	  Apollo-­‐17	  were	  cancelled,	  even	  though	  the	  Saturn-­‐5	  rock-­‐ets	   had	   been	   built	   and	  were	   operational,	  because	  of	   the	   large	  cost	  of	   the	  program.	  	  Despite	   the	   unquestionable	   success	   of	  Apollo,	  many	  people	  now	  realize	   that	   the	  suite	  of	  conditions	  that	  enabled	  it	  was	  an	  anomaly	   that	   is	  not	   likely	   to	  be	  repeated.	  	  No	   one	   has	   been	   back	   to	   the	   Moon,	   or	  even	  travelled	  beyond	  LEO,	  in	  42	  years.	  	  	  	  After	   the	   Apollo	   program,	   the	  Moon	  was	  mostly	   ignored	   for	  many	  years.	   	  The	   first	  US	  mission	   to	   the	  Moon	  after	  Apollo	  was	  the	   Clementine	   mission	   in	   19945.	   	   This	  was	   a	   low	   cost	  mission	   that	  mapped	   the	  lunar	   surface	   and	   returned	   tantalizing	  hints	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  water	  in	  the	  per-­‐manently	  shadowed	  lunar	  craters.	  	  In	  Oct.	  2009,	  the	  LCROSS	  mission	  impact-­‐ed	   one	   of	   these	   permanently	   shadowed	  craters	   and	   the	   data	   obtained	   from	   this	  project	   confirmed	   the	   presence	   of	   large	  quantities	   of	   water,	   as	   well	   as	   methane,	  ammonia,	   carbon	   dioxide	   and	   carbon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	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  4	  http://beforeitsnews.com/space/2014/03/nasa-­‐end-­‐manned-­‐space-­‐flight-­‐2-­‐2476914.html	  5	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/LCROSS/searchforwater/clementine.html	  
monoxide6;	   all	   very	   useful	   materials	   for	  future	  lunar	  activities.	  	  
Returning	  To	  The	  Moon:	  	  If	  At	  First	  You	  
Don’t	  Succeed	  .	  .	  .	  	  On	  July	  20th	  1989,	  the	  20th	  anniversary	  of	  the	   Apollo	   11	   landing,	   President	   George	  H.W.	  Bush	   initiated	  the	  Space	  Exploration	  
Initiative	  to	  return	  Americans	  to	  the	  Moon	  and	  eventually	  to	  Mars7.	  	  A	  NASA	  “90	  Day	  Study”	   group	  was	   formed	   to	   explore	   op-­‐tions	   to	   carry	   out	   this	   assignment.	   	   	   The	  price	   tag	   for	   this	   20-­‐30	   year	   program	  came	  out	  to	  be	  a	  whopping	  $400-­‐500	  bil-­‐lion.	  	  The	  program	  quietly	  died	  in	  the	  ear-­‐ly	  1990’s.	  	  	  	  On	   February	   1st	   2003	   the	   Space	   Shuttle	  Columbia	  disintegrated	  upon	  reentry	  over	  Texas	   killing	   all	   seven	   astronauts	   on	  board.	   	  Responding	  to	  this	  disaster	  Presi-­‐dent	   George	   W.	   Bush	   rolled	   out	   an	   ex-­‐traordinary	   Vision	   for	   Space	   Exploration	  (VSE)8	  on	  January	  14,	  2004.	  	  The	  VSE	  had	  been	   carefully	   developed	   and	   had	   four	  major	  thrusts:	  1. Implement	  a	  sustained	  and	  affordable	  human	   and	   robotic	   program	   to	   ex-­‐plore	  the	  solar	  system	  and	  beyond.	  2. Extend	   human	   presence	   across	   the	  solar	   system,	   starting	   with	   a	   human	  return	  to	  the	  Moon	  by	  the	  year	  2020,	  in	   preparation	   of	   human	   exploration	  of	  Mars	  and	  other	  destinations.	  3. Develop	   the	   innovative	   technology,	  knowledge	   and	   infrastructures	   both	  to	   explore	   and	   to	   support	   decisions	  about	   the	  destinations	   for	   human	  ex-­‐ploration.	  4. Promote	   international	   and	   commer-­‐cial	   participation	   in	   exploration	   to	  further	   U.S.	   scientific,	   security	   and	  economic	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/LCROSS/main/index.html	  7	  http://history.nasa.gov/sei.htm	  8	  http://history.nasa.gov/sep.htm	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There	   were	   several	   important	   new	   ele-­‐ments	  in	  the	  VSE	  as	  well:	  1. Direct	   references	   to	   sustainable,	   af-­‐fordable	  and	  flexible	  exploration.	  2. The	   realization	   that	   infrastructure	  would	  be	  needed	   to	  enable	   this	   long-­‐term	  exploration.	  3. The	  focus	  on	  using	  lunar	  and	  asteroid	  materials	   to	   reduce	   the	   mass	   that	  must	  be	  transported	  from	  Earth.	  4. The	  instruction	  to	  “Pursue	  commercial	  
opportunities	  for	  providing	  transporta-­‐
tion	  and	  other	  services	  support	   for	  the	  
International	  Space	  Station	  and	  explo-­‐
ration	   missions	   beyond	   low	   Earth	   or-­‐
bit”.	  5. Return	  US	  astronauts	  to	  surface	  of	  the	  Moon	  by	  2020.	  To	   fulfill	   the	  VSE,	  new	  NASA	  Administra-­‐tor	  Mike	  Griffin	  initiated	  the	  Constellation	  
Program9.	   	  Constellation	  consisted	  of	   two	  launch	   vehicles:	   the	  Ares-­‐1	   for	   launching	  crew,	   and	   the	   Ares-­‐5,	   a	   large	   heavy	   lift	  launch	   vehicle	   for	   cargo.	   	   In	   addition	   to	  the	  launch	  vehicles,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  new	  crew	   capsule	   (Orion)	   and	   a	   large	   lunar	  lander	   (Altair)	   proposed.	   	   Following	   the	  program	  rollout	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2005,	  a	  number	   of	   criticisms	   quickly	   arose	   re-­‐garding	   the	   viability	   of	   the	   proposed	  launch	   systems,	   particularly	   the	   Ares-­‐1.	  	  Work	  proceeded	  on	  Constellation	  despite	  these	  criticisms.	  	  	  	  In	   May	   2009	   newly	   elected	   President	  Barack	   Obama	   commissioned	   a	   “Review	  of	   the	   US	   Human	   Spaceflight	   Plan	   Com-­‐mittee”	  (the	  Augustine	  Committee10).	   	  The	  Committee	   spent	   five	   months	   reviewing	  the	  Constellation	  program	  and	  concluded	  that,	   contrary	   to	   the	   VSE	   guidelines,	   the	  program	  was	   not	   “sustainable”.	   	   On	   Feb-­‐ruary	  1st,	  2010	  with	  the	  rollout	  of	  the	  his	  FY	   2011	   NASA	   budget,	   President	   Obama	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/constellation/main/index2.html	  10	  http://www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/home/	  
cancelled	   the	   Constellation	   program	   and	  retargeted	  NASA	  to	  send	  astronauts	  to	  an	  asteroid,	   rather	   than	   returning	   them	   to	  the	  Moon.	  	  The	  cancellation	  of	  the	  Constellation	  pro-­‐gram	   and	   the	   re-­‐vectoring	   of	   US	   human	  space	  program	  to	  visiting	  an	  asteroid,	  ra-­‐ther	   than	   returning	   to	   the	   Moon,	   was	   a	  major	   blow	   to	   many	   in	   the	   aerospace	  community.	  	  It	  was	  a	  blow	  to	  a	  number	  of	  members	   of	   Congress	   as	   well.	   	   Congress	  reacted	  by	  demanding	  a	  standup	  of	  a	  new	  heavy	   lift	   rocket	   program,	   the	   Space	  
Launch	   System	   or	   SLS	   (essentially	   the	  Ares-­‐5	   launch	   vehicle),	   to	   take	   the	   place	  of	  Constellation.	  	  SLS	  along	  with	  the	  Orion	  crew	   capsule	   remain	   the	   NASA	   principle	  programs	   of	   record	   for	   human	   explora-­‐tion	   beyond	   LEO	   as	   of	   the	   time	   of	   this	  writing.	   	  The	   current	  public	  program	  ob-­‐jective	   of	   SLS/Orion	   is	   to	   provide	  transport	  for	  astronauts	  to	  an	  unspecified	  asteroid	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  2020’s	  that	  will	  be	   moved	   to	   a	   cis-­‐lunar	   location,	   and	  eventually	  on	  to	  Mars	  in	  the	  2030’s.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Engaging	  Emerging	  Commercial	  Space	  	  At	   the	   time	   that	   the	   Constellation	   pro-­‐gram	   was	   being	   pursued,	   NASA	   made	   a	  very	  wise	   decision	   to	   engage	   the	   emerg-­‐ing	   commercial	   space	   industry.	   	   The	  
Commercial	   Orbital	   Transportation	   Ser-­‐
vices	  (COTS)	  program	  was	  instrumental	  in	  developing	  new	  US	   launch	   capabilities	   at	  very	  low	  cost	  and	  risk	  to	  the	  government.	  	  COTS	  is	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  a	  model	  for	  future	  space	  capability	  development.	  	  	  	  In	   January	   2006,	   NASA	   announced	   the	  COTS	  program.	   	  The	  objective	  of	   the	  pro-­‐gram	  was	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  capability	  of	  commercial	   providers	   to	   deliver	   cargo	  and	   potentially	   crew	   to	   the	   International	  Space	   Station	   (ISS)	   at	   a	   lower	   cost	   than	  traditional	   aerospace	   operating	   under	  standard	  contracting	  approaches.	  	  	  An	  ini-­‐tial	   program	  budget	  of	   $500M	  was	  made	  available	  and	  awards	  were	  made	  through	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competitively	   selected	   NASA	   funded	  Space	  Act	  Agreements	   (SAA).	   	  The	  use	  of	  the	  SAA	  is	  important	  because	  it	  offered	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  cost	  plus	  contracts	  that	  were	   typically	   used	   by	   NASA	   for	   large	  space	   development	   projects.	   	   The	   SAA’s	  utilized	   performance-­‐based	   milestones:	  Companies	   would	   only	   be	   paid	   a	   previ-­‐ously	   agreed	   amount	   upon	   successful	  completion	   of	   milestone.	   	   This	   model	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  very	  effective	  and	  is	  now	  referred	   to	   in	   this	   document	   as	   the	  “Commercial	  Leverage	  Model.”11	  	  	  Twenty-­‐one	   proposals	   were	   received	   in	  response	   to	   the	   COTS	   program	   solicita-­‐tion,	   and	   initial	   award	   selection	   went	   to	  two	   companies:	   SpaceX 12 	  run	   by	   Elon	  Musk	   and	   RocketPlane	   Kistler13 	  run	   by	  George	  French.	  	  The	  program	  was	  execut-­‐ed	   using	   pre-­‐negotiated,	   firm	   fixed	   price	  milestones	   and	   associated	   payments.	  	  	  SpaceX	  met	  all	  of	  their	  milestones	  leading	  to	  the	  development	  and	  successful	  launch	  of	   a	   Falcon-­‐9	   rocket	   in	   June	   2010,	   and	   a	  demonstration	   flight	   of	   their	   Dragon	  spacecraft	  to	  the	  ISS	  in	  May	  2012	  –	  an	  his-­‐torical	  first	  for	  a	  private	  company.	  	  	  	  Rocketplane	   Kister	   did	   not	   fare	   as	   well.	  	  After	   completing	   some	   early	   milestones,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  meet	  a	  key-­‐financing	  milestone.	   	   Their	   agreement	   with	   NASA	  was	  eventually	  canceled	  in	  October	  2007.	  	  	  The	  funds	  made	  available	  by	  this	  cancela-­‐tion	  were	  then	  re-­‐competed	  and	  this	  time	  Orbital	   Sciences14 	  (Orbital)	   received	   an	  award.	   	   	   Similar	   to	   SpaceX,	   Orbital	   pro-­‐ceeded	  to	  meet	  all	  their	  milestones	  and	  in	  April	   2013	   successfully	   demonstrated	  their	  new	  Antares	  launch	  vehicle.	  	  Then	  in	  September	   of	   2013,	   Orbital	   became	   the	  second	   private	   company	   to	   successfully	  launch	   and	   berth	   their	   resupply	  module,	  Cyngus,	  to	  the	  ISS.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Pittman,	  Rasky,	  Harper,	  IAC-­‐12,	  D3,2,4,x14203	  12	  http://www.spacex.com/	  13	  http://www.kistler.co/	  14	  https://www.orbital.com/	  
A	   formal	  assessment	  of	   the	  COTS	  program	  
by	  NASA15	  showed	  unambiguously	  that	  the	  
commercial	   leverage	   model	   could	   reduce	  
development	   costs	   by	   an	   order	   of	   magni-­‐
tude	  over	  traditional	  development	  methods.	  	  	  While	   both	   SpaceX	   and	   Orbital	   were	  working	  to	  complete	  their	  COTS	  program	  milestones,	   NASA	   awarded	   them	   two	  large,	   competitively	   selected	   service	   con-­‐tracts	   under	   the	   Commercial	   Resupply	  
Services	  (CRS)	  program16.	  	  	  The	  award	  was	  for	  eight	  ISS	  cargo	  flights	  valued	  at	  about	  $1.9	  billion	  from	  Orbital	  Sciences,	  and	  12	  cargo	   flights	   valued	   at	   about	   $1.6	   billion	  from	   SpaceX.	   	   Added	   to	   the	   financial	   in-­‐centive	   from	   the	   COTS	   program,	   these	  additional	   contract	   awards	   were	   very	  welcome	   news	   to	   the	   companies	   as	   they	  worked	  to	  develop	  and	  demonstrate	  their	  cargo	  launch	  capabilities	  for	  the	  ISS.	  	  	  	  Since	  2009,	   following	   the	  very	   successful	  COTS	   and	   CRS	   example,	   NASA	   has	   been	  pursuing	   a	   similar	   approach	   to	   establish	  commercial	  based	  crew	  transportation	  to	  the	   ISS.	   	   The	   Commercial	   Crew	   Program	  
(CCP),	  used	  the	  same	  commercial	  leverage	  model	   that	  was	   used	   for	   COTS.	   	   The	  CCP	  was	   divided	   into	   four	   phases.	   	   On	   Sep-­‐tember	   16,	   2014	   the	   final	   Commercial	  
Crew	   Transportation	   Capability	   (CCtCap)	  phase	  was	  announced	  with	  awards	  going	  to	   Boeing	   and	   SpaceX.	   	   	   This	   phase	   will	  fund	   the	   two	   companies,	   $4.2	   billion	   for	  Boeing	   and	   $2.6	   billion	   to	   SpaceX,	   to	  demonstrate	  crew	  to	  ISS	  transfer	  of	  up	  to	  seven	  astronauts	  by	   late	  2017.	   	   	  The	  cap-­‐sules	  will	  also	  serve	  a	  lifeboat	  function	  at	  the	  ISS	  and	  will	  allow	  the	  crew	  size	  to	  in-­‐crease	  from	  six	  to	  at	  least	  seven.	  	  At	   the	   time	   that	   NASA	  was	   pursuing	   the	  COTS	   program,	   the	   privately	   funded	  
Google	  Lunar	  XPRIZE	  was	   announced17	  in	  September	   2007.	   	   With	   a	   prize	   purse	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/586023main_8-­‐3-­‐11_NAFCOM.pdf	  16	  http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/12/spacex-­‐and-­‐orbital-­‐win-­‐huge-­‐crs-­‐contract-­‐from-­‐nasa/	  17	  http://www.googlelunarxprize.org/	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$30	   million,	   it	   was	   an	   audacious	   chal-­‐lenge:	   	   Send	   a	   robotic	   spacecraft	   to	   the	  Moon,	  land	  safely,	  traverse	  across	  the	  sur-­‐face	   at	   least	   500	   meters	   and	   send	   back	  video	   and	   other	   information	   from	   the	  Moon	  to	  the	  Earth.	  	  The	  first	  private	  team	  to	  accomplish	  this	  by	  December	  31,	  2015	  will	   be	   awarded	   $20	   million,	   with	   a	   se-­‐cond	  place	  prize	  of	  $5	  million,	  and	  $5	  mil-­‐lion	   in	   bonus	   prizes.	   	   Currently,	   with	   a	  little	  over	  one	  year	   left	  to	  accomplish	  the	  task,	  there	  are	  still	  18	  official	  teams	  in	  the	  competition	   and	   at	   least	   5	   of	   the	   teams	  have	   made	   significant	   progress	   toward	  the	  goal.	   	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  com-­‐petition	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   it	   was	   going	   to	  cost	  significantly	  more	  than	  $20	  million	  to	  win	   the	   prize,	   and	   so	   fund	   raising	  would	  be	   one	   of	   the	   major	   challenges	   for	   the	  competing	  teams.	  	  The	   winning	   of	   the	   XPRIZE	   will	   be	   an	  enormous	  feat:	  these	  will	  be	  the	  first	  pri-­‐vately	  funded	  craft	  to	  land	  on	  the	  Moon	  …	  but	   what	   then?	   	   If	   the	   Google	   Lunar	  XPRIZE’s	   stated	   goal	   of	   “inspiring	   a	   new	  
generation	   of	   private	   investment	   in	   space	  
technology”	   is	   to	   be	   fully	   realized,	   the	  achievements	   of	   these	   private	   lunar	   pio-­‐neers	  will	  only	  have	  been	  a	  first	  step.	  The	  question	   that	   must	   then	   be	   addressed	   is	  what	  comes	  next?	  	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   teams	   involved	   in	   the	  Google	  Lunar	  XPRISE	  are	   looking	  beyond	  the	   scope	   of	   the	   competition.	   These	   or-­‐ganizations	  will	  be	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  scale	  up	  their	  work	  and	  land	  increasingly	  large	  payloads	  onto	  the	  lunar	  surface	  with	  growing	   efficiency	   and	   even	   return	   sam-­‐ples	   to	   Earth.	   But	   without	   some	   kind	   of	  organizing	   element,	   this	   could	   lead	   to	  wasteful	   duplication	   or	   even	   destructive	  competition.	  	  The	   Google	   Lunar	   XPRIZE	   teams	   who	  were	   hoping	   to	   provide	   transport	   and	  other	  services	  to	  support	  NASA’s	  Constel-­‐lation	   lunar	   program	  were	   negatively	   af-­‐fected	  by	  its	  cancelation	  in	  early	  2010.	  	  To	  help	  at	  least	  partially	  compensate	  for	  this	  
change,	   in	   October	   2010,	   NASA	   an-­‐nounced	  the	  selection	  of	  six	  companies	  to	  participate	   in	   the	   Innovative	   Lunar	  
Demonstration	   Data	   (ILDD)	   program 18 .	  	  	  ILDD	  was	  a	  $30	  million	  program	  targeted	  at	  the	  US	  XPRIZE	  teams	  to	  offer	  up	  to	  $10	  million	  to	  each	  team	  in	  exchange	  for	  shar-­‐ing	  data	  about	  their	  development	  process	  and	  experience	  with	  NASA.	  	  	  	  In	  2009	   the	  NASA	  Ames	  Research	  Center	  Space	   Portal	   Office	   and	   the	   State	   of	   Ha-­‐waii	   Department	   of	   Aerospace	   Develop-­‐ment	   in	   collaboration	   with	   colleagues	  from	  around	  the	  world	  rolled	  out	  the	  con-­‐cept	   for	   an	   International	   Lunar	   Research	  
Park	   (ILRP)19,20.	   	  The	   concept	   was	   to	   de-­‐velop	   a	   self-­‐supporting	   research	   park	   on	  the	  Moon	  in	  three	  phases:	  1. Establish	   high	   fidelity	   lunar	   analog	  sites	  on	  Earth	  to	  develop,	  explore	  and	  verify	   needed	   technologies	   and	   capa-­‐bilities.	  2. Establish	   a	   “lunar	   robotic	   village”	   on	  the	  Moon	  with	  advanced	  and	  collabo-­‐rative	   robotics,	   additive	   manufactur-­‐ing	  and	   in-­‐situ	   resource	  utilization	   to	  prepare	   the	   site	   for	   eventual	   human	  occupation.	  3. Send	   humans	   to	   the	   Moon	   to	   begin	  living	   and	   working	   there	   while	   con-­‐tinuing	   to	   advance	   capabilities	   of	   the	  ILRP,	  and	  developing	  useful	  and	  reve-­‐nue	  making	  products.	  	  	  	  This	   concept	  was	   found	   to	  be	  compelling	  to	   a	   number	   of	   high-­‐profile	   individuals,	  was	   discussed	   at	   length	   during	   several	  international	   meetings,	   and	   described	   in	  several	   conference	   papers.	   	   It	   was	   even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_10-­‐259_ILDD_Award.html	  19	  International	  Lunar	  Research	  Park	  https://sites.google.com/site/internationallunarresearchpark/	  20	  International	  Lunar	  Research	  Park	  Exploratory	  Work-­‐shop	  https://sites.google.com/site/ilrpexploratoryworkshop2011/	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featured	  on	  This	  Week	  at	  NASA21.	   	  Unfor-­‐tunately,	   similar	   to	   many	   of	   the	   Google	  Lunar	   XPRIZE	   competitors,	   it	   was	   found	  that	  without	  a	  significant	  commitment	  by	  the	   government	   to	   pursue	   human	   lunar	  space	   activities,	   the	   technical	   and	   finan-­‐cial	  risks	  are	  too	  large	  to	  attract	  sufficient	  investment	  to	  get	  the	  ILRP	  off	  the	  ground.	  
	  
Recent	  Developments	  
	  A	  number	   of	   relevant	   and	   notable	   devel-­‐opments	  that	  could	  significantly	  affect	  the	  nation’s	   space	   activities	   and	   programs	  have	  begun	   to	  emerge.	   	   Leveraging	   these	  activities	   could	   significantly	   reduce	   the	  cost	   and	   speed	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Lunar	  Station	  concept.	  	  	  First,	   SpaceX 22 	  recently	   launched	   their	  thirteenth	   successful	   Falcon-­‐9	   rocket	   (in	  thirteen	   attempts)	   and	   are	   working	   on	  three	  important	  new	  capabilities:	  1. Development	   of	   a	   reusable	   Falcon-­‐9	  launch	   system	   (Falcon-­‐9R)	   which	  could	   significantly	   reduce	   launch	  costs	   even	   further	   from	   their	  ~$60M	  currently	  for	  a	  Falcon-­‐9	  that	  launches	  13.5MT	   to	   low-­‐earth-­‐orbit	   (LEO),	  down	   to	   around	   $10M	   per	   launch.	  	  This	   is	   easily	   a	   factor	   of	   ten	   below	  current	  space	  industry	  pricing.	  2. Development	   of	   a	   Falcon-­‐heavy	   (Fal-­‐con-­‐H)	  that	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  putting	  over	   50MT	   to	   LEO	   for	   a	   price	   of	  ~$135M,	  and	  which	  is	  expected	  to	  fly	  in	  2015.	  	  The	  closest	  current	  available	  US	   capability	   is	   ~23MT	   that	   can	   be	  lofted	   to	   LEO	   by	   a	   	   Delta-­‐4	   Heavy	  rocket	  for	  a	  price	  of	  ~$380M.	  3. Development	   of	   a	   new	   liquid-­‐oxygen/methane	   rocket	   engine	  (called	   Raptor)	  with	   approximately	   a	  one-­‐million	  pound	  thrust	  capability	  -­‐-­‐	  similar	   to	   the	   engines	   used	   on	   the	  NASA	  Saturn-­‐5	  first	  stage.	   	  The	  inten-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/podcasting/TWAN_04_15_11.html	  22	  http://www.spacex.com/	  
tion	  apparently	  is	  to	  use	  this	  engine	  to	  power	   a	   Falcon-­‐super-­‐heavy	   rocket	  that	   could	   loft	   ~200MT	   to	   LEO	   to	  support	   crewed	   Mars	   missions.	  SpaceX	  CEO	  Elon	  Musk	  calls	   this	  new	  vehicle	   the	   Mars	   Colonial	   Transport	  (MCT).	  Second,	   Bigelow	   Aerospace	   continues	   to	  advance	  their	  expandable	  space	  modules,	  following	   the	   successful	   in-­‐space	   demon-­‐strations	  of	  two	  scale	  models	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  that	  are	  still	  in	  orbit.	  	  Bigelow	  Aero-­‐space	   now	   has	   a	   contract	   with	   NASA	   to	  put	  a	  small	  module	  called	  the	  Bigelow	  Ex-­‐pandable	   Activity	   Module	   or	   BEAM23	  on	  the	  ISS	  starting	  in	  2015.	  	  In	  addition,	  Bige-­‐low	   is	   currently	   advertising	   a	   bigger	   ex-­‐pandable	   module	   they	   call	   the	   BA-­‐330	  that	  has	  a	  pressurized	  volume	  of	  330	  cu-­‐bic	   meters,	   and	   which	   they	   say	   could	  serve	   as	   a	   deep-­‐space	   habitat	   for	   four	   to	  six	  crew	  for	  an	  extended	  period.	  	  	  The	  investment	  community	  is	  now	  show-­‐ing	   interest	   in	   lunar	   exploration	   and	   de-­‐velopment.	  	  On	  Saturday,	  August	  23,	  2014	  a	  workshop	  was	  held	  at	  the	  noted	  Silicon	  Valley	   venture	   capital	   investment	   house,	  Draper-­‐Fischer-­‐Jurvetson	  (DFJ).	   	  The	  title	  of	  the	  workshop	  was	  “Low	  Cost	  Strategies	  
for	   Lunar	   Settlement”,	   and	   it	   was	   orga-­‐nized	   by	   Steve	   Jurvetson	   of	   DFJ.	   	   	   The	  workshop	  brought	   together	  about	  50	  sci-­‐entists,	   engineers,	   executives	   and	   entre-­‐preneurs,	   who	   have	   significant	   back-­‐grounds	   and	   interests	   in	   lunar	   explora-­‐tion	   and	   development,	   including	   a	   num-­‐ber	  of	  NASA	  and	   former	  NASA	  personnel	  and	  an	  Apollo	   astronaut.	   	  The	  group	  was	  assembled	   to	   answer	   the	   question:	   Is	   it	  
possible	  to	  have	  a	  permanent	  human	  lunar	  
settlement	  of	  about	  10	  people	  on	  the	  Moon	  
by	  2022,	  for	  a	  price	  tag	  of	  $5	  billion	  or	  less?	  The	   surprising	   consensus	   answer	   to	   this	  question	   was	   a	   qualified	   “Yes,	   under	   the	  
right	   organizational	   and	   funding	   condi-­‐
tions”.	   	   There	   were	   no	   technical	   show-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/beam_feature.html	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stoppers	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  technolo-­‐gies	   needed	   were	   either	   on	   the	   shelf	   or	  could	   be	   developed	   in	   a	   relatively	   short	  period	   of	   time	   using	   contemporary	   tech-­‐niques.	  	  The	  group	  agreed	  to	  write	  a	  set	  of	  papers	   outlining	   those	   conditions,	   and	  NewSpace	  magazine	  will	  dedicate	  a	  future	  issue	  to	  publishing	  the	  results.	  One	   particularly	   interesting	   idea	   that	  emerged	  from	  the	  meeting	  was	  the	  “Apol-­‐lo	  Prize24”.	  	  This	  would	  be	  a	  $1	  billion	  dol-­‐lar	   prize	   for	   the	   first	   organization	   that	  succeeded	  to	  “Transport	  two	  or	  more	  peo-­‐
ple	   to	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   Moon,	   and	   then	  
return	  them	  safely	  back	  to	  Earth”.	   	  Several	  individuals	  are	  now	  pursuing	   this	   idea	   in	  earnest.	  	  	  Outside	   of	   the	   US,	   interest	   continues	   to	  grow	  for	  pursuing	  human	  missions	  to	  the	  Moon.	   	   Most	   recently	   the	   Chinese	   have	  clearly	   shown	   their	   intents	   concerning	  the	  Moon	  with	   their	  successful	  Chang’e-­‐3	  lunar	   robotic	   spacecraft25.	   	   The	   Russians	  have	  also	  recently	  stated	  their	   interest	   in	  putting	   Russian	   cosmonauts	   on	   the	  Moon26.	  	  The	  International	  Space	  Explora-­‐tion	   Coordination	   Group	   (ISECG)	   is	   com-­‐prised	  of	  members	  representing	  the	  space	  agencies	   of	   14	   countries.	   The	   ISECG	   has	  produced	  a	  Global	  Exploration	  Roadmap27	  and	  the	  near	  term	  goal	  of	  the	  vast	  majori-­‐ty	  of	  this	  groups	  members	  is	  the	  Moon.	  
	  
Returning	  To	  The	  Moon:	  Lunar	  Station	  
-­‐	  The	  Next	  Logical	  Step	  
	  The	  intent	  of	  the	  Lunar	  Station	  is	  to	  put	  a	  permanent	   human	   facility	   on	   the	   Moon	  using	   the	   demonstrated	   capabilities	   and	  best	   practices	   derived	   from	   the	   develop-­‐ment	   and	   operation	   of	   the	   International	  Space	   Station.	   	   Lunar	   Station	  would	   be	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Courtesy	  Charles	  Miller,	  spacepolicy@yahoo.com	  25	  http://www.universetoday.com/107716/china-­‐considers-­‐manned-­‐moon-­‐landing-­‐following-­‐breakthrough-­‐change-­‐3-­‐mission-­‐success/	  26	  http://rt.com/news/157800-­‐russia-­‐moon-­‐colonization-­‐plan/	  27	  http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/about/isecg/#.VA-­‐gRI1dVS_	  
facility	   capable	  of	   supporting	   crews	  of	  6-­‐10	   people	   by	   providing	   shelter,	   power,	  life	   support,	   communications	   and	   the	  ability	   to	   egress	   from	   the	   facility	   and	  travel	  across	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Moon.	  	  It	  is	  envisioned	   to	   be	   developed	   primarily	  through	   a	   consortium	   of	   public,	   private,	  and	  international	  contributors,	  and	  would	  be	   the	   kernel	   around	   which	   the	   broader	  capabilities	   of	   the	   ILRP	   could	   nucleate.	  The	   Lunar	   Station	   community	   would	  jointly	   develop	   and	   share	   infrastructure	  as	   well	   as	   separately	   develop	   and	   own	  specific	   capabilities.	   Activities	   would	  range	   from	   scientific	   research	   and	   tech-­‐nology	   development,	   to	   resource	   mining	  and	   processing,	   to	   human	   exploration	   of	  the	  Moon	  and	  even	  tourism.	  	  	  The	   existence	   proof	   that	   this	   type	   of	   en-­‐terprise	   can	   be	   developed	   successfully	  beyond	   Earth	   is	   the	   ISS,	  which	  was	   built	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  used	  by	  sixteen	  coun-­‐tries.	  The	  ISS	  now	  features	  commercial	  as	  well	   as	   science	   and	   technology	   activities,	  and	   has	   been	   continuously	   inhabited	  since	   November	   2000.	   Similar	   to	   the	   ISS	  but	  with	  a	  broader	  set	  of	   stakeholders	   in	  mind,	   Lunar	   Station	   will	   be	   developed	  with	   investments	   from	   nations,	   commer-­‐cial	  developers,	  philanthropists,	  academic	  institutions	   and	   even	   private	   citizens	   to	  develop	  and	  evolve	  the	  facilities	  over	  time.	  	  	  For	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   analysis	   we	  will	  use	  the	  ISS	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  establishing	  the	  initial	  capabilities	  that	  will	  be	  targeted	  for	  Lunar	  Station.	  	  These	  are	  listed	  as	  follows.	  	  	  	  
Lunar	  Station	  Initial	  Goals:	  Pressurized	  volume:	  	   900+	  cubic	  meters	  	  Habitable	  volume:	  	   300+	  cubic	  meters	  Power:	  	   	   	   100+	  KW	  Initial	  crew	  size:	  	   6	  -­‐	  10	  people	  Life	  support	  recovery:	  	   90%	  or	  better	  Crew	  rotation:	   	   Every	  six	  months	  Initial	  lunar	  mass:	  	   150+	  MT	  Initial	  yearly	  resupply:	  	   30+	  MT	  The	   largest	   delta	   with	   respect	   to	   ISS	  numbers	   is	   the	   initial	   lunar	   mass	   of	  150+MT	   compared	   to	   the	   ISS	   mass	   of	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420	   MT.	   	   We	   believe	   this	   lower	   mass	   is	  enabled	  by	  using	  the	  soon	  to	  be	  available	  pre-­‐fabricated	  Bigelow	  Aerospace	  habitat	  modules	  (described	  in	  more	  detail	  below)	  compared	   to	   the	   traditional	   hard-­‐body	  modules	   used	   on	   ISS.	   	   Mass	   savings	   can	  also	  be	  anticipated	  from	  the	  effective	  use	  of	   ISRU	  and	   additive	  manufacturing	   (dis-­‐cussed	   more	   below).	   	   With	   the	   current	  and	   near	   term	   capabilities	   of	   emerging	  commercial	   space	   companies,	   such	   as	  SpaceX	  and	  Bigelow	  Aerospace,	  building	  a	  lunar	   facility	   that	   meets	   these	   goals	   ap-­‐pears	  very	  feasible	  at	  this	  time,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed.	  	  In	  considering	  a	  budget	  for	  both	  the	  build	  and	   operational	   phases	   of	   Lunar	   Station	  ISS	  again	  served	  as	  a	  guide.	  	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	   the	   initial	   effort	   will	   result	   from	   a	  largely	  government-­‐funded	  program.	  The	  current	   annual	   budget	   for	   the	   ISS	   runs	  about	  $3	  billion	  per	  year.	   	  Given	  contem-­‐porary	   commercial	   capabilities	   and	   ap-­‐proaches,	   and	   to	   promote	   more	   cost-­‐effective	   choices,	   an	   annual	   budget	   level	  of	   approximately	   $2	   billion	   per	   year	   for	  Lunar	   Station	   is	   considered.	   	   Of	   the	   $2	  billion,	   roughly	   half	   is	   assigned	   to	   trans-­‐portation	   with	   the	   remainder	   funding	  payloads	  and	  operations.	   	  Once	  the	  initial	  station	   is	   underway,	   additional	   funding	  from	  international	  and	  private	  partners	  is	  anticipated.	  	  An	   essential	   capability	   for	   building	   and	  operating	  Lunar	  Station	   is	   transportation	  to	   the	   Lunar	   surface.	   	   Table	   1	   gives	   a	  summary	   of	   current	   US	   transportation	  options	  beyond	  LEO,	   including	   listing	   the	  capabilities	   of	   the	   NASA	   Saturn-­‐5	   rocket	  for	   comparison	   (cost	   numbers	   for	   the	  Saturn-­‐5	   have	   been	   adjusted	   to	   current	  year	  values).	   	  The	  data	   in	   the	   table	   come	  from	   a	   variety	   of	   public	   sources	   and	   in-­‐corporate	   a	   number	   of	   assumptions	   as	  well	   as	   engineering	   and	   professional	  judgment.	  	  As	  such,	  these	  numbers	  should	  be	  used	  more	  for	  comparison	  of	  different	  
launch	  options	  than	  numbers	  for	  detailed	  mission	  planning.	  	  	  
	  As	  can	  be	  seen	   from	  the	   table,	   the	  recent	  and	   future	   development	   of	   the	   SpaceX	  launch	   capabilities	   could	   be	   very	   im-­‐portant	  to	  achieving	  an	  economically	  via-­‐ble	   approach	   for	  build	   and	  operating	  Lu-­‐nar	   Station.	   	   	   Assuming	   a	   transportation	  budget	   of	   approximately	   $1	   billion	   per	  year	   as	   previously	   discussed,	   the	   time	  frames	   to	   achieve	   150MT	   on	   the	   lunar	  surface	   run	   from	   a	   little	   over	   nine	   years	  using	  a	  Falcon-­‐9,	  down	  to	  five	  years	  for	  a	  Falcon-­‐H,	  and	  down	  to	  three	  years	  using	  a	  Falcon-­‐HLRF	  (described	  below).	  	  Also,	  the	  Falcon-­‐H	   and	   Falcon-­‐HLRF	   are	   the	   only	  options	   that	   achieve	   the	   operational	   re-­‐quirement	  of	  30+MT	  yearly	  re-­‐supply	   for	  approximately	   $1	   billion	   a	   year	   of	   trans-­‐portation	   costs.	   	   	   Note	   the	   other	   launch	  options	   require	   a	   considerably	   longer	  time	   to	   get	   the	   150MT	   of	   payload	   to	   the	  lunar	   surface,	   with	   a	   minimum	   of	   26	  years	  using	   a	  Delta-­‐4	  heavy.	   	  Also	   all	   the	  other	   options	   fall	   considerable	   short	   of	  the	  30+MT	  yearly	   re-­‐supply	   requirement	  for	  $1	  billion	  of	  transportation	  costs.	  	  Falcon-­‐HLRF	   stands	   for	   Falcon-­‐heavy,	  LEO	  Re-­‐Fueled.	   	   It	   is	   an	   extrapolation	   by	  the	  authors	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  launch	  capabil-­‐ity	  that	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  combining	  a	  Falcon-­‐H	  with	  multiple	   flights	  of	   a	   future	  low-­‐cost	  reusable	  Falcon-­‐9R.	  	  	  The	  idea	  is	  to	   put	   a	   Falcon-­‐H	   “tanker”	   (Falcon-­‐HT)	  into	  LEO,	  partially	  fueled,	  and	  then	  top-­‐off	  through	  the	  rendezvous	  and	  fuel	   transfer	  of	  multiple	  (approximately	  10)	  Falcon-­‐9R	  flights	  carrying	  only	  fuel	  for	  payload.	  	  This	  would	  provide	  a	  low-­‐failure	  consequence,	  high-­‐flight	  rate	  payload	  for	  the	  Falcon-­‐9R	  that	  is	  well	  tuned	  to	  its	  reusable	  capabili-­‐ties.	   	   With	   the	   fully	   fueled	   Falcon-­‐HT	   in	  LEO,	  a	  second	  Falcon-­‐H	  with	  its	  lunar	  pay-­‐load	   is	   launched	   to	   LEO,	   retaining	   its	   se-­‐cond	  stage	  after	  main-­‐engine	  cut-­‐off.	  	  This	  Falcon-­‐H	   then	   rendezvous	   with	   the	   Fal-­‐con-­‐HT,	   transfers	   fuel	   to	   refill	   the	   re-­‐tained	   Falcon-­‐H	   second	   stage	   (similar	   to	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aircraft	   aerial	   refueling),	   separates	   from	  the	   Falcon-­‐HT,	   and	   then	   re-­‐fires	   its	   re-­‐tained	  second	  stage	  to	  perform	  the	  trans-­‐lunar-­‐injection	  burn.	  	  Note	  comparing	  the	  Falcon-­‐HLRF	   to	   the	   numbers	   for	   the	   Sat-­‐urn-­‐5	   vehicle,	   that	   this	   approach	   would	  yield	  Saturn-­‐5	  type	  lunar	  payload	  capabil-­‐ities	  for	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  historical	  costs	  of	  the	   Saturn-­‐5.	   	   Also	   this	   large	  payload	   ca-­‐pability	   may	   be	   particularly	   useful	   for	  sending	   prefabricated	   crew	   habitats	   to	  the	  lunar	  surface	  as	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  Concerning	   the	   SLS	   rocket	   currently	   un-­‐der	   development	   by	   NASA,	   note	   that	   its	  capabilities	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   Saturn-­‐5,	  particularly	   the	   SLS-­‐Block2,	   while	   being	  somewhat	   lower	  cost.	   	  However,	  because	  of	   its	   low	  expected	  flight	  rate	  and	  signifi-­‐cant	   costs,	   it	   doesn’t	   appear	   to	   fit	  within	  the	   cost	   envelope	   for	   supporting	   Lunar	  Station.	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	   a	  very	  good	  option	  for	  a	   crew	  habitat	   is	   soon	   to	  be	  available	  from	  Bigelow	  Aerospace	  (BA).	  	  Real	  estate	  entrepreneur	  Bob	  Bigelow	  founded	  BA	  in	  1999.	   	   BA	   licensed	   technology	   from	   the	  NASA	  Transhab	  project	  that	  was	  develop-­‐ing	  expandable	  space	  habitats	  for	  sending	  astronauts	  to	  Mars.	   	   	  Although	  NASA	  was	  making	  excellent	  progress	  and	  developing	  very	  promising	  technology,	  Congress	  can-­‐celed	   the	   Transhab	   program	   in	   2000.	  	  Starting	   with	   the	   NASA	   technology	   base,	  Bigelow	   invested	   over	   a	   decade	   of	   effort	  and	   ~$250	  million	   of	   his	   own	  money	   to	  develop	  and	  flight-­‐test	  this	  technology	  for	  in-­‐space	  crew	  habitats.	  	  In	  2006	  and	  again	  in	  2007	  BA	  launched	  two	  small	  technolo-­‐gy	  demonstration	  modules:	  Genesis	  1	  and	  2.	   	  These	  units	  have	  performed	  very	  well	  and	  are	  still	  operational.	   	  Bigelow	   is	  now	  well	   into	   the	  development	   of	   the	  BA-­‐330	  which	  as	   the	  name	   implies	  will	  have	  330	  cubic	   meters	   of	   pressurized	   volume	   and	  mass	  of	  ~20MT.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  modules	  is	  capable	   of	   supporting	   up	   to	   six	   crew-­‐members	   for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	   time.	  	  While	  the	  original	  BA-­‐330	  is	  designed	  for	  
LEO,	   BA	   is	   currently	   developing	   an	   en-­‐hanced	  version,	  the	  BA-­‐330MDS	  for	  lunar	  surface	  operation.	  	  	  	  Once	  initial	  goals	  have	  been	  specified	  and	  viable	   transportation	   and	   crew	   habitat	  options	  have	  been	  identified,	  the	  next	  de-­‐cision	  is	  the	  location	  for	  Lunar	  Station;	  i.e.,	  site	  selection.	  	  A	  number	  of	  different	  loca-­‐tions	   could	   be	   proposed,	   but	   the	   polar-­‐regions	  provide	  three	  key	  benefits:	  1. Continuous	  sun-­‐light	  providing	  con-­‐tinuous	  power	  2. Access	  to	  cold-­‐traps	  in	  permanently	  shadowed	  craters	  that	  hold	  stores	  of	  water	  and	  useful	  hydrocarbons	  3. Lower	  surface	  temperature	  swings	  compared	  to	  off-­‐polar	  locations.	  Once	   a	   facility	   is	   established	   at	   a	   pole,	  eventual	   exploration	   and	   development	  missions	  to	  off-­‐polar	  locations	  could	  then	  be	   pursued.	   	   Site	   locations	   at	   both	   the	  South	   and	   North	   Lunar	   poles	   should	   be	  considered,	  but	  based	  on	  the	  more	  advan-­‐tageous	   topography,	   we	   initially	   are	   se-­‐lecting	   Peary	   crater28	  at	   the	   Lunar	   North	  pole	  for	  our	  assessment.	  	  Further	  analysis	  and	  discussion	  would	  be	  needed	   to	   final-­‐ize	   the	   selection,	   but	   other	   lunar	   experts	  have	  noted	  the	  attributes	  of	  this	  site29.	  We	  suggest	   therefore	   that	   Peary	   crater	   be	  treated	   as	   the	   “site	   to	   beat”	   relative	   to	  other	  site	  candidates.	  	  
	  
Lunar	  Station	  Build	  Scenario	  
	  
Precursor	  Missions	   –	  We	  propose	  a	  Lu-­‐nar	   Station	   build	   scenario	   as	   follows.	  	  First	   a	   series	   of	   precursor	   robotic	   mis-­‐sions	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  Peary	  crater	  to	  do	  a	   “resources	   and	   hazards”	   assessment.	  	  This	   would	   provide	   both	   surface	   truth	  data	   about	   the	   resources	   in	   the	   perma-­‐nently	  shadowed	  crater	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ter-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/LRO/multimedia/lroimages/lroc-­‐20091224-­‐peary-­‐crater.html	  29	  http://www.space.com/957-­‐perfect-­‐spot-­‐moon-­‐base.html	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rain	  on	  the	  northern	  rim	  of	  the	  crater	  that	  is	   exposed	   to	   almost	   constant	   sunlight	  according	  to	  the	  orbital	   images	  from	  sev-­‐eral	   lunar	   orbiter	   missions	   the,	   most	   re-­‐cent	   being	   the	   NASA	   Lunar	   Reconnais-­‐sance	   Orbiter30 	  (LRO).	   	   The	   precursors	  will	  be	  searching	  for	  volatiles	  in	  the	  crater	  and	  a	  suitable	   landing	  site	  and	  base	   loca-­‐tion	  on	  the	  crater	  rim.	  	  
Power	  and	  Comm	  –	  Assuming	  this	  site	  is	  evaluated	   to	   be	   a	   suitable	   location,	   a	   se-­‐ries	  of	  missions	  to	  prepare	  the	  site	  would	  then	   be	   launched.	   	   	   One	   of	   the	   first	   ele-­‐ments	   to	   be	   landed	   would	   be	   a	   100	   KW	  solar	   Power	   and	   Communication	   station	  (weighing	   approximately	   4	   MT)	   with	   a	  100m	   tall	   boom	   to	   continuously	   collect	  sunlight	   and	   convert	   it	   into	   electricity.	   A	  graphic	   illustration	   of	   such	   a	   power	   sta-­‐tion,	   courtesy	   of	   SkyCorp31	  is	   shown	   in	  Figure	  1.	  	  	  
	  
Site	  Prep	  –	  Managing	  dust	  at	  the	  landing	  sites	   and	   habitats	   is	   a	   significant	   issue.	  	  Inspired	   by	   the	   utility	   of	   rugged	   flexible	  Bobcats™,	   electrically	   powered	   multi-­‐function	  excavators,	  or	  “MoonCats”	  would	  then	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  site	  to	  level	  off	  the	  terrain	   for	  both	  the	   landing	  pads	  and	  the	  habitation	   site.	   	   Equipment	   to	   either	   sin-­‐ter	   or	   otherwise	   stabilize	   the	   regolith	  would	  then	  be	  sent	   to	   the	  site.	   	  All	  of	   the	  equipment	   would	   be	   operated	   autono-­‐mously	   or	   through	   tele-­‐operations	   from	  Earth.	   	  Once	   the	   landing	  pads	  and	  berms	  were	   put	   in	   place,	   roadways	   would	   be	  constructed	   from	   the	   regolith	   leading	  from	   the	   landing	   pads	   to	   the	   habitation	  site.	  	  The	  habitation	  site	  would	  be	  sized	  to	  initially	   accommodate	   up	   to	   three	   BA-­‐330MDS	  for	  crew	  habitat	  and	  operations.	  	  	  
ISRU	  and	  Additive	  Manufacturing	   –	   In-­‐situ	   resource	   utilization	   along	  with	   addi-­‐tive	   manufacturing	   may	   provide	   signifi-­‐cant	   benefits	   for	   building	   and	   operating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  http://lunar.gsfc.nasa.gov/	  31	  http://www.skycorpinc.com/Skycorp/Home.html	  
Lunar	  Station.	  	  	  	  However,	  much	  more	  will	  need	  to	  be	  learned	  about	  resources	  at	  the	  site,	   effective	   procedures	   and	   processes,	  required	   precursor	   materials	   and	   equip-­‐ment,	  hazards	  and	  potential	  malfunctions,	  and	  methods	  of	  repairs	  before	   firm	  plans	  can	  be	  made	  relying	  on	  these	  capabilities	  and	   approaches.	   	   Pursuing	   experiments	  and	  investigations	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  during	  the	  site	  preparation	  period	  would	  be	  very	  advantageous	   in-­‐order	   to	   make	   the	   re-­‐quired	   assessments	   and	   establish	   effec-­‐tive	  procedures.	  This	  in	  turn	  could	  lead	  to	  the	   integration	  of	   an	  appropriate	   level	  of	  ISRU	  and	  additive	  manufacturing	  into	  the	  station	  build	  and	  operation	  plans.	  	  
Landing	   Crew	   Habitats	   –	   Once	   the	   site	  prep	  has	  been	  completed,	  BA-­‐330’s	  would	  then	   be	   sent	   to	   the	   lunar	   surface.	   	   Given	  their	   large	  gross	  mass	  of	  20MT,	   the	  easi-­‐est	  way	  to	  accomplish	  this	  maybe	  to	  use	  a	  Falcon-­‐HLRF	  to	  deliver	  a	  BA-­‐300	  to	  Low-­‐Lunar-­‐Orbit	   (LLO).	   	   There	   it	   could	   ren-­‐dezvous	  with	  four	  “Lunar	  Descent	  Mules”	  that	   have	   been	   pre-­‐positioned	   in	   LLO	   by	  earlier	  Falcon-­‐H	  or	  Falcon-­‐HLRF	  launches.	  	  The	  four	  lunar	  descent	  mules	  would	  then	  lower	   the	   BA-­‐330MDS	   to	   the	   Lunar	   Sta-­‐tion	   site	   landing	   pad	   area.	   	   This	   is	   illus-­‐trated	   conceptually	   in	  Figure	  2.	   	   The	  BA-­‐330	  would	  then	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  previous-­‐ly	  sent	  “Lunar	  Surface	  Mules”	  and	  moved	  to	   the	   habitation	   site	   where	   it	   would	   be	  positioned	  and	  potentially	  joined	  together	  with	  other	  modules,	   as	   illustrated	   in	  Fig-­‐ure	   3.	   	   Power	   from	   the	   power	   station	  would	   then	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   habitats	  for	  operation.	  
	  
Crew	   Transport	   –	   With	   the	   habitats	   in	  place,	   crew	   could	   then	   be	   sent	   to	   Lunar	  Station	  to	  begin	  its	  permanent	  occupancy.	  	  One	  way	  this	  could	  be	  accomplished	  is	  to	  pre-­‐position	   a	   “Gryphon”	   reusable	   crew	  lunar	   lander	   at	   LLO	   using	   a	   Falcon-­‐H.	  	  Then	  a	  crew	  of	  four	  to	  six	  could	  be	  sent	  on	  a	   “Deep	   Space	  Dragon”	   (DSD)	   to	   LLO	  us-­‐ing	   a	   second	   Falcon-­‐H.	   	   The	   DSD	   would	  rendezvous	  with	   the	  Gryphon	   lander,	   the	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crew	  and	  light	  payloads	  would	  transfer	  to	  the	   Gryphon,	   the	   Gryphon	   would	   detach	  from	   the	   DSD,	   and	   then	   descend	   to	   the	  lunar	   surface.	   	   For	   departure	   from	   the	  Moon,	   the	   crew	   would	   re-­‐board	   the	  Gryphon	   lander	   and	   ascend	   to	   LLO	   for	  rendezvous	  with	   the	  orbiting	  DSD	   ,	   sepa-­‐rate	   from	   the	  Gryphon,	   and	   then	   fire	   the	  Dragon	  engines	   for	   return	   to	  Earth	  using	  direct	  entry.	  	  	  	  
Initial	   Operating	   Capability	   and	   Re-­‐
supply	   –	   With	   the	   initial	   infrastructure	  and	   crew	   in-­‐place,	   Lunar	   Station	   would	  begin	   its	   initial	   operations.	   	   Focus	  would	  be	   on	   investigations	   for	   resources	   and	  hazards,	  possibilities	  for	  food	  growth	  and	  bioregenerative	   life	   support,	   ISRU	   activi-­‐ties	  and	  assessments,	  and	  medical	  and	  life	  sciences	   investigations	   affecting	   long	  term	   habitation	   in	   low	   gravity.	   	   After	   a	  sufficiently	   robust	   initial	   operating	   capa-­‐bility	   is	   achieved,	   attention	   could	   turn	   to	  expanding	   and	   evolving	   Lunar	   Station	  into	   a	   more	   multi-­‐function,	   multi-­‐asset	  facility	  accommodating	  a	  greater	  number	  of	   people	   and	   capabilities,	   and	   bringing	  on	   additional	   private,	   government	   and	  international	   partners	   that	   leverage	   and	  expand	  the	  infrastructure.	  	  The	  aim	  would	  be	  to	  eventually	  grow	  to	  a	  fully	  functional	  International	   Lunar	   Research	   Park,	   pur-­‐suing	  both	  private	  and	  government	  inter-­‐ests	   and	   activities.	   	   This	   would	   include	  lunar	   capabilities	   and	   resources	   that	  would	  be	  very	  beneficial	   for	  NASA	  to	  use	  to	   accomplish	   our	   aspirations	   for	   human	  explorations	  of	  Mars.	  
	  
A	  Business	  Case	  For	  The	  Moon	  
	  Experience	  with	  the	  Google	  Lunar	  XPRIZE	  and	  the	  ILRP	  shows	  that	  the	  prospects	  are	  dim	   for	  private	   interests	  alone	   to	  accom-­‐plish	  significant	  lunar	  surface	  activities	  at	  this	  time	  –	  it’s	   just	  too	  expensive	  and	  too	  risky.	   	   In	  order	   for	   lunar	  development	   to	  become	  a	  reality,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  need	  for	  the	  government	  to	  make	  key	  investments	  
to	   lower	   technical	   and	   financial	   risks	   –	  Lunar	   Station	  would	   be	   a	  wise	   approach	  in	   this	   regard.	   	   There	   are	   many	   historic	  precedents	   for	   this	   type	   of	   government	  investment	   including	   the	   interstate	   high-­‐way	   system,	   municipal	   utilities,	   and	   the	  internet.	   	  Recent	  NASA	  programs	  such	  as	  COTS/CRS	   have	   also	   demonstrated	   the	  efficacy	   and	   benefits	   of	   this	   approach.	  	  The	   public/private	   and	   international	  partnerships	   that	   would	   likely	   develop	  following	   the	   initial	   government	   invest-­‐ment	   in	   Lunar	   Station	   would	   further	   ex-­‐tend	   its	   capabilities	   and	   functions,	   while	  providing	   beneficial	   lunar	   activities,	   re-­‐sources	   and	   possible	   revenue	   streams.	  	  This	   is	   how	   a	   solid	   business	   case	   for	   the	  Moon	  can	  be	  accomplished.	  	  	  	  
Conclusions	  	  With	   the	   ISS	   built	   and	   operational,	   our	  space	   program	   needs	   a	   clear,	   timely,	  achievable,	  and	  highly	  engaging	  next	  step.	  	  This	  next	  step	  must	  also	  serve	  as	  an	  ena-­‐bling	  pathway	  for	  NASA’s	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  human	   missions	   to	   Mars	   and	   human	   or	  robotic	   exploration	   and	   development	   of	  asteroids	   and	   other	   planetary	   bodies.	   	   A	  clear,	  achievable	  and	  highly	  engaging	  next	  step	  is	  also	  essential	  for	  NASA	  to	  maintain	  its	   relevance	   to	   the	  US	   public,	   its	   leader-­‐ship	   in	   the	   international	   community,	   and	  its	   technical	   cutting	   edge.	   	   Lunar	   Station	  could	  meet	  these	  objectives,	  as	  our	  initial	  analysis	  has	  shown.	  	  	  Lunar	   Station	   falls	   inside	   of	   reasonable	  time-­‐lines	   (about	   5	   years	   to	   build)	   and	  budget	   levels	   (~$2	   billion/year	   to	   build	  and	   operate)	   and	   can	   be	   accomplished	  with	   current	   and	   near	   term	   capabilities.	  Pursued	  under	  the	  feasibility	  proof	  of	  ISS,	  using	   best	   practices	   extracted	   from	   its	  build	   and	   operation,	   and	   combined	   with	  the	   current	   and	   emerging	   capabilities	  from	   the	   traditional	   and	   emerging	   aero-­‐space	  industry,	  Lunar	  Station	  is	  the	  logical	  next	  step	  in	  space	  development.	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Table	  1	  –	  Comparison	  of	  launch	  options	  for	  building	  and	  operating	  Lunar	  Station	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Figure	  1	  -­‐	  100	  KW	  Power	  Lander	  (courtesy	  SkyCorp)	  
Lunar Station Launch Options* Saturn-5 SLS-Block1 SLS-Block2 Atlas-5 401 Delta-4 Heavy Falcon-9 Falcon-H Falcon-HLRF Falcon-9R
Launch vehicle fixed price (M$/yr) $3,169 $1,500 $1,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Launch vehicle variable price (M$/unit) $565 $500 $750 $187 $380 $62 $135 $250 $10
LEO Payload Cap (MT) 117.5 70.0 130.0 9.8 23.0 13.2 53.2 140.7 9.2
TLI Payload Cap (MT) 45.6 30.0 56.4 4.2 9.8 4.6 18.6 47.2 N/A
# Launches/yr 1 0.5 0.33 4.2 2 11 5 3 28.5
Total Price (M$) per LEO Launch $3,734 $3,500 $5,295 $187 $380 $62 $135 $250 $10
Cruise stage and lander price (M$/unit) $375 $250 $375 $50 $100 $25 $54 $82 N/A
Total Price (M$) per Lunar Launch $4,109 $3,750 $5,670 $237 $480 $87 $189 $332 $10
Lunar Surface Payload Cap (MT) 16.4 8.8 16.3 1.2 2.9 1.5 6.0 16.9 N/A
MT/yr to Lunar Surface 16.4 4.4 5.4 5.1 5.8 16.4 30.1 50.7 N/A
Launch Cost/yr (M$) $4,109 $1,875 $1,871 $995 $960 $957 $947 $996 $285
# Launches to get 150MT on the Lunar 
Surface 9.2 17.1 9.2 122.4 52.2 100.6 24.9 8.9 N/A
Years to get 150MT on the Lunar 
Surface 9.2 34.3 28.0 29.2 26.1 9.1 5.0 3.0 N/A
Notes: * - Cost and other data from a variety of public sources.  
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  Figure	  2	  –	  Illustration	  of	  a	  lunar	  crew	  habitat,	  with	  attached	  lunar	  descent	  mules	  	  (courtesy	  of	  Masten	  Space	  Systems)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  3	  –	  Illustration	  of	  a	  three-­‐habitat	  module	  Lunar	  Station	  facility	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (courtesy	  of	  Bigelow	  Aerospace)	  	  	  	  
